Southern Business Review
Volume 18

Issue 2

Article 3

October 1992

The U.S. Supreme Court's Opinion in California v. American Stores
CO. et al.: Resolution of a Conflict in the Interpretation and
Application of Section 16 of the Clayton Act
Anthony J. Greco
University of Southwestern Louisiana

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/sbr
Part of the Business Commons, and the Education Commons

Recommended Citation
Greco, Anthony J. (1992) "The U.S. Supreme Court's Opinion in California v. American Stores CO. et al.:
Resolution of a Conflict in the Interpretation and Application of Section 16 of the Clayton Act," Southern
Business Review: Vol. 18: Iss. 2, Article 3.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/sbr/vol18/iss2/3

This article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Digital Commons@Georgia Southern. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Southern Business Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons@Georgia Southern. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@georgiasouthern.edu.

THE U. S. SUPREME COURT'S OPINION
IN CALIFORNIA v. AMERICAN STORES
CO. et al.: RESOLUTION OF A CONFLICT
IN THE INTERPRETATION AND
APPLICATION OF SECTION 16 OF THE
CLAYTON ACT
Anthon;, J. Greco

Introduction
On March 21, I 988, American Stores, Inc., the fourth largest supermarket chain 111 California, notified the FfC under the Han-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 of its intention to acquire the outstandmg
stock of Lucky Stores, Inc., the state's largest supermarket cham. This hostile
takeover bid sought to brmg 592 California supermarkets under one management. California immediately undertook a revie,, of the competime implications of this acqu1s1t1on.
American 5oon increased its tender offer and Lucky's board approved the
merger. The FfC 111,es11gated the proposed merger and soon negotiated a
settlement with American. In fact, on May 31, I 988, the Commission imultam:ously filed a complaint allegmg that the merger , iolated ec11on 7 of
the Clayton Act as ,,ell as a proposed con ent order d1spos111g of the charges
subject to certain cond1110ns. In keeping with its consent agreement procedures, the FfC solicned pubhc comment on the proposed agreement. In addition, it entered 11110 a l lold Separate Agreement w11h American requiring
it to hold the opera11ons of Lucl-y separate from Its o,, n until the Commission had completed its re, 1e,, of the proposed consent order.
During this period, the State of California repeated!} ,,arned American
that failure of the FfC to remedy 11s concerns could result 111 legal ac11on
by the state. American ignored these warnings and quicl-ly completed its acquisition of the L ucl-y stocl- by accompll hmg a short-form merger under
Dela,,arc Ia,,. On Ju ly 22, 1988, California filed t11ncly comments ,,ith the
FfC ,,h1ch analyzed the harm the proposed acqu1s111on ,,ould bring to
California consumers and recommended that the f
withdra,, II\ proposed
consent agreement. H owever, the Commission gave final approval to the proposed consent agreement on August 31, 19 , ,, 11hou1 mod1fy1ng II to address a ny of Cali fornia's concerns.
California immediately filed suit under Jurisdiction of ecuon 16 of the
Clayton Act in federal district court seel-ing a preliminary 111Junc11on agamst
the acquisition. The court granted the inJunction on eptember 29, I 988,
concluding that this was necessary to pro, ide an effective remedy to an unlawfu l merger. A merican a ppea led to the United States Court of A ppeals,
inth Circ uit. The case wa argued on December 8, 1988, and decided on
March 3 1, 1989. In its decision, the inth Circuit affirmed the district court'
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findings concerning the likelihood that California would prevail on its claim
that the merger violated section 7 of the Clayton Act. The court did not dispute that California had proved the need for preliminary injunctive relief.
However, the court maintained that the preliminary injunction ordered by
the district court was "overly broad" and constituted an abuse of discretion
because it ordered American to operate it sub idiaries separately. The court
equated this to indirect divestiture and held that divestiture was not a remedy available under Section 16 of the Clayton Act. Hence, the Court of Appeals held that although California had demonstrated the need for injunctive
relief, it was not entitled to divestiture. It remanded the case to district court
essentially holding that the lower court could, under the circumstances of
the case, order remedie relative to conduct but not to structure.
California petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a \Hit of certiorari. The
Court granted this writ, and the case was argued on January 16, 1990, and
decided on April 30, 1990. The Court reversed the decision of the circuit
court and remanded the case. The essence of its ruling \vas that divestiture
(a structural) remedy is a form of injunctive relief authorized by Section 16
of the Clayton Act. This ruling gives great latitude to pri\ate parties under
Section 16. This paper discusses the California suit, as well as the ensuing
opinions of the district court, the inth Circuit Court of Appeals, and the
United State Supreme Court. The bases on ,, h1ch these respective courts
reached their deci ions, as well as the impacts thereof, "ill be examined.
The California Complaint
As mentioned, the State of California filed a complaint m United States
District Court for the Central District of California seeking injunctive relief
against the acquisition of Lucky Stores, by American Stores on September
l, 1988 (State of California v. American Stores Co..!!!_Qan_y, Ci\ ii o. 88-05331
K ). The state's ac11on was instituted under Sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act. Section 4 entitles a private party to sue to recover for inJuric sustained as a result of an antitrust viola11on. Section 16 allows private panic
to seek to restrain such a violation through the granting of injuncti, c relief.
The viola11on herein charged was one of Secuon 7 of the Clayton Act. Damage
recovery and violation restraint were also sought under Section I of the Sherman Act. The state brought the action as parens patriae on behalf of its residents and also on its O\\O behalf against American Stores Company, one
of its subsidiaries, and Lucky Stores, Inc. American is engaged primaril)
in the selling of food and drug merchandise through approximately 1,500
outlets in forty states. Lucky Stores and its subsidiaries, divisions, or groups
operate supermarkets in seven states. In California it had approximately 340
supermarkets with an annual sales volume exceeding $4 billion. As such, it
ranked first among California supermarkets in both number of stores and
sales volume. American ranked fourth in the state with nearly two and onehalf billion dollars in annual sales and 252 stores (State of California v. American Stores Company, Petition for Writ of Certiorari).
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The state defined the relevant product market as the retailing by supermarkets of food and non-food products. Sixty-two areas of California were
designated as relevant geographic markets (State of California v. American
Stores Company. Civil o. 88-05331 KN). The state contended that American and Lucky were actual and significant competitors in the relevant product
market in nearly a ll of relevant geographic markets and were potentially significant competitors in the remaining ones. To bolster its case, the state named
the Vons Companies and the Safeway Stores as defendants. In December,
1987, Vons had entered into an agreement with Safeway to essentially purchase Safeway's Southern California Division. The Federal Trade Commission had given final approval to this acquisition on August 31, 1988, the day
prior to California's filing of the present suit. Vons was the third leading
supermarket retailer in the state with 197 stores and sales in excess of $3 billion. Safe\vay had been the second largest retailer in the state\\ ith 327 tore
and sales at nearly $3. 75 billion (State of California v. American Stores ComPfilll:, Petition for Writ of Certiorari). The combination of the acquisition
1moh111g the four largest retailers in the state prompted California to file
its antitrust suit.
Relative to its charge of a \IOlation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, the
state asserted that the effect of the acquisition by American of Lucky, especially in light of the earlier Vons acquisition, may be to subscantially le en
competition 111 the relevant product and geographic markets. pecifically,
California claimed that actual and potential competi11on between American
and Lucky 111 the relevant product market in many geographic markets would
be eliminated. Also, Lucky" ould be eliminated a a substantial and independent competnor 111 the relevant markets. Further, compe1i11on between compelllors in general in these markets \\OUld be sub tantially lessened. In
addition, the state feared that the acqu1slllon would lead 10 sigmficant increases in already moderate-to-lugh levels of concentration, as well as 10 substantial increases in the barriers to entr, into supermarket retailing. Finally,
the \late peculated that compe11tion 111 the relevant markets may be substantially Jes ened such 1ha1 pnce might be 111crea-,ed @ate of California
\. American Store~ (Qmpam, Ci\ ii o. 8 -05331 K ).
Under its Sherman Act charge, the stme claimed that the proposed acquisition constituted an illegal combination and contract in re traint of trade
under Section I of the Act. The state also claimed that the proposed acqu1 it ion violated I\\0 state statutes. As implied predously, the State requested
the district court to i sue a temporary restraining order and a preliminary
injunction against the defendants preventing and restraining them and all
others from taking any action to further the proposed acquisition. Further,
the state urged that the proposed acqui ition be adjudged and decreed to
be unlawful under a ll the aforementioned statutes (~tale of Califq_rnia v,
American Store. Company, Ci\il o. 88-05331 K ).
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The District Court'!> RulinR
Regarding the granting of a preliminary injunction, the district court considered the fo llowing: ( I) whether the plaintiff had demonstrated, at the minimum, a fair chance of uccess on the merit ; (2) whether the plaintiff had
demon trated a significant threat of irreparable injury; and, (3) whet her the
plaintiff had demonstrated at least a minimal tip in the balance of hardships
even when the strongest showing on the merits is made. In considering the
first of these, the court declared that statistical e\idence of market share and
concentration resulting from a merger could establish a pnma fac1e case or
the presumption that the proposed merger \\Ould \1olate the Clayton Act
by sub tantially le sening competition Hm,e\ er, the court pointed out that
the presumption of such a \iolat1on based on post merger market statistics
was not conclusive but could be overcome only b} a shO\\ ing that the tatistics did not accurate!; reflect the probable effect ot the proposed merger on
competition (State of California, Plaintiff~\. P,mencan ..StQres Company,
697 F. Supp.).
The court noted that a variet; of statistical indicators could be used to
determine if a proposed merger could be presumed to substantially lessen
competition. It primarily focused on the Herfindahl-Hirshman Index which
is calculated by summing the squares of the percentages of market share held
b 1 each of the firms in a specific market. A, such, this index reflect\ the
entire market's d1stnbut1on of marl-.et shares. In 11s 1984 Merger Guideline ,
the Department of Justice defined index ranges for moderately and highly
concentrated markets and ,pecified increases in the index that might present
serious antitrust questions under either range definition.
Before an examination of the stamt1cal evidence of marl-.et concentration
resulting from a proposed merger can be conducted, one must, as the court
pointed out, carefully define the relevant product and geographic markets
in ,,hich competition may be affected. A suggested above, California had
defined the product marl-.et as supermarkets selling food and non-food items
("full line grocery stores \1,1th more than 10,000 square feet"). fhe defendants, however, wanted a broader definition that included retail grocer; purchases from outlets, such as smaller "mom and pop" grocer; stores,
convenience stores, and certain non-grocery stores. The court accepted the
state's definition asserting that even if convenience stores and the like competitively priced a few food 11ems in direct competition \\ ith supermarl-.ets,
that was insufficient to ju,tify the broader product market definition proposed by the defendants. In addition, the court noted that the state had
demomtrated that the defendants' O\\ n marketing documents focused exclusively on supermarket shoppers and competition from other supermarkets (State of California, Plaintiff, v. American Stores Company, 697 F.
Supp. ).
Although the State of California had sought to d efi ne the relevant geographic market in terms o f 62 distinct ma rkets, the defenda nts wa nted to
defi ne it as fourteen ( 14) individ ual Metro polita n Sta tistical Areas (" MSAs")
as specified by the O ffice o f Ma nagement a nd Budget. The district court felt
4

that neither definition would be dispositive or crucial to the outcome of the
analysis of the case. It, therefore, initially assumed that the defendants could
prevail at trial on the broader definition and analyzed the acquisition's effect on the basis of individual-firm product market shares, as well as on concentration ratios. Using the "supermarket" definition of the product market,
the court found that, across the fourteen MSAs defined by the defendants,
the post-merger market share would be significant. Further, even using the
broader product market definition, the court still felt that the post-merger
market share average was significant and that this, coupled with a four-firm
concentration ratio in excess of 50 percent, indicated a highly concentrated
market (State of California, Plaintiff. v. American Stores Company, 697
F. Supp.).
The court then examined the data submi11ed by the two partie relative
10 the merger', impact on Herfindahl-1lershman Indices. On the bases of
supermarkets and the fourteen MSAs as the respective relevant product and
geographic markets, the court found that post-merger HH ls indicated a h1ghl}
concentrated market and that the resulting increase m HHI agam raised antitrust concerns (State of California, Plamtiff, v. American Stores Compafil, 697 F. Supp.).
Such concerns were also raised \vhen the court com1dered the broader
product market definition proposed by the defendants (State QI California,
Plaintiff, \. American StQre~ Compan1 , 697 r. Supp.). Finall}, the court
requested add111onal informauon from the parties on market share trends
in relevant markets. The court found the data supplied by the state 10 be
more e:-.tens1ve and more compelling. On the basis of such data, the court
concluded that there was a substanual trend toward increased concentration
tn the MSAs under both the state\ and the defendants' product market definitions. The court concluded that the foregomg e\ldence ovcrn helming!}
created the presumption that the increased concentration in the relevant markets that would result from the proposed merger \vould substantially lessen
compe1111on 111 those market, and, therefore, presented a rujma facie v1ola11on of Section 7 of the Clayton Act (State of California~ Plaintiff, v. American Stores Compan}, 697 F. upp.).
This pre umpuon, a, the court noted, could be overcome by evidence that
the market share statistics give an inaccurate account of the merger's probable effect on competiuon, \Vllh the burden of proof resting on the defendants. The court, therefore, examined evidence relative to the ease of entry
11110 the relevant mad-.et {~tate of California, Plaintiff. , . American tore~
Company, 697 F. Supp.). Further, although the defendants a11empted to rebut
the presumption of illegality suggested by the market share data, the court
found their arguments unper ua ive (State of California, Plaintiff. v. American Store Company, 697 F. Supp.). Consequently, the distnct court concluded that the defendants had not met their burden of demonstrating that
the market share tati tics did not accurately reflect the proposed merger's
probable effect o n competition . T herefore, the plaintiff had at this point basically d emonst rated , a t the mi ni m um, a fa ir c hance of success at trial on the
merits.
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As indicated earlier, the tate had requested a preliminary injunction
preventing the parties to the propo ed merger from taking further action to
consummate it. Further, it sought to permanently enjoin the merger. The
defendants, however, objected that a permanent inJunction was equivalent
to divestiture since, they contended, the two parties had already affected the
merger. However, the district court reasoned that the defendants' argument
contravened the very purpose of the Federal Trade Commission's Agreement
to Hold Separate of May 1988. Since this agreement was still 111 effect at
the time of the district court's consideration of the case, the court ruled that
if such agreements had an} meaning, the Joining of the l\\O defendants did
not constitute a completed merger. It pointed out that the two defendants
\\ere still performing numerous functions as separate entities and that they
had retained their separate names and respective corporate 1dent1ties (State
Qf California. Plaintiff. v. American _$.tores Company, 697 F. Supp.).
With reference to the shO\\ ing of a significant threat of irreparable injury
resulting from the proposed merger, the distnct court held that the State of
California had, indeed, done so. The state argued that the lessening of competiuon predicted as a result of 1h1s merger 1s precise!} the kind of irreparable mJury that remedies under the Clajton Act were designed to prevent.
The state felt that, unless restrained, American Stores would rapidly restructure ns acquired chain and Its assets, thereby disabling It from operating independentl> of its ne11 parent. 'vloreover, the state contended, if preliminary
relief is not awarded and the merger is subsequently ruled unla1\ ful, it would
be extremely difficult, and perhaps impossible, to rerned, the situation (State
of California, Plamuff, v. Amex1can__S_tQ1'~ Compafil, 697 r. Supp.).
Further, the defendants argued that if preliminar, relief \\ere granted, they
\\Ould suffer irreparable harm farm excess of an, possible risk that the proposed merger \1ould lessen competition. I lowever, the district court concluded
that the harm the plaintiff would undergo if the merger 11ere not enJoined
would far outweigh the harm the defendants might endure if the merger were
halted. The court, therefore, ordered the prelimmar} restraint and required
that the two companies be operated separately until the issue of the permanent mJunction would be decided at trial (S_tate_ Q_f Californ@.,___Plainti~
American Stores Com~, 697 I- . Supp.).
The Ruling of the

I

inth Circuit Court of Appeals

As indicated earlier, the defendants in this case appealed the district court's
ruling to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The basis of the appeal was
that the district court had abused Its discretion and had erred in granting
California's motion for a preliminary injunction. The appeals court noted
the different product market definitions proposed by the opposing parties.
However, It tated that its present task was li mited and did not include an
independent evaluation of the evidence of the relevant product market. The
facts upon which the district court relied were, the court felt, supported by
expert testimony. Therefore, the appeals court concluded that the district
court did not abuse its discretion relative to its designation of the product
6

market (State of California. Plaintiff-Appellee. v. American Stores CompallY, 872 F. 2d).
Next, the appeals court considered the defendant 's claim that the district
court erred in its analysis of the merger's effects on competition. The court
reviewed all the data presented and the district court's handling o f same,
as previously discussed. Again, the appeals court concluded the statistics relied upon by the district court were not clearly erroneous and were supported by expert testimony. It went on 10 conclude that the district had not abused
its discretion in findi ng that California had established a prima facie violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act (State of California. Plaintiff-Appellee,
v._f\merican Stores Company, 872 F . 2d). Further, the court also concluded
that the district court's ho lding that the defendants had failed to rebut the
presumption of illegality did not constitute an abu e of discretion (State of
California, Plainuff-Appellee, \. Amencan Store2 Company, 872 F. 2d). In
addition, the a ppeals court was atisfied that California had shO\\ n both likelihood of succes on merits and the possibility of irreparable harm and, hence,
felt II was unnecessary 10 com1der the defendants' arguments concerning the
balance of hard hips (State of <;;:alifornia, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Amencan
Stores C o ~ . 872 F. 2d).
Ho,ve,er, the defendants cnJoyed much greater success on the final poruon of their appeal, 1.e., that the relief 1ha1 the district court had ordered
in its preliminary inju nction was not avai lable 10 California (a private party)
under Section 16 of the Clayton Acl.
Recall that this secuon allO\\ s any part} to sue for injunctive relief again t
threatened los or damage resulting from an antitrust violation. As \uggested earlier, the district court's order had essentially required defendant American to insure that it and its subsidiaries and divisions operated independent!}
of the as,ets and bu,inesses of Luck} tores and specified that American
had to refrai n from taki ng any further steps 10 merge or integrate its assets
and businesses "ith those of Lucky Stores.
Amencan argued that the order required di,estiture, rescission, or di oluuon, forms of relief which were unavailable 111 a permanent injuncuon 10
pm ate parties under Section 16. The appeals court reviewed some relevant
cases and \\ ent on 10 sa} 1ha1 the d1smc1 court's 111Junc1ion on HS face did
not order divestiture but rather was similar 10 the FTC' Hold eparate Order
111 that it prevented the integration of two ,,holly-O\\ned sub idiaries of a
common parent (State of Califgrnia. Plainuff-Appellee. v. American lQI'e
Compam,, 872, F. 2d). T hat parent, Amencan, insisted that this ,,as tantamount 10 an indirect divestit ure. California, however, as erted that the o rd er merely maintained the stat us quo. The di trict court fe lt that its Hold
Separate could be granted becau e the o perations of the two parties to the
merger had yet to be integrated completely due 10 the FTC's con ent o rder.
That is, it believed that the merger had 1101 been consummated. I fence, it
felt that its preliminary injunction did not a nd could not constitute dive titurc or dissolution (State of California, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. American Store
Company, 872 F. 2d).
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The appeals court, however, concluded that the district court had misapprehended the la\, of divestiture. It felt that the prehmmary injunction ordered prevented the defendant from exerc1s111g an important form of control
over its 1,,0 wholly-owned ubsidianes in that ll required these (Lucky and
Alpha Beta) to act as competitors. The circuit court declared that such an
injunction required indirect divestiture. Further, the court held that the district court had misapprehended the la" governing corporate mergers in concluding that the merger had not been completed. It held that the FTC's
consent order did not undo the legal effect of the merger as affected under
Delaware law. Rather, the court said that ll merel) forestalled the complete
1111egration of the two firms. This m1sunderstand111g of the district court concerning the merger's legal status, the circuit court felt, compounded the lower
court's mi apprehension of the la,, of divestiture ~tate of CalifQrnia.
Plaintiff-Appellee, v. American Store~ ~ompan1. 872 F. 2d).
In pursuing this divestiture question, the appeals court declared that the
purpo e of the FTC's consent order was to preserve lb abiht} to seek divestiture 1f the defendant did not adhere to its condiuom. However, It asserted
that California could not obta111 di,esrnure relief The court felt that California. othern 1se not entitled to d1vest1ture, should not be able to bootstrap
itself into this remedy, even temporarily, through the consent order designed
to protect the rights of the FTC, "hich ,, as said to be ent11 led to ,uch relief.
Further, the appeals court expounded that there mu,t be some reasonable
relat1onsh1p bel\veen the prelimmary 1111unction and the permanent relief requested; that 1s, the preliminary relief granted should ensure the availability
of the perm1ss1ble permanent relief sought. Since the circuit court found such
a relationship to be miss111g 111 the present case, it concluded that the preliminar) injunction granted there111 wa overly broad. The circuit court, therefore, ruled that the district court had abused HS discretion 111 ordering the
defendant to operate It subs1d1anes separately The court did feel that its
holding did not foreclose California from obta111111g 111Junct1ve relief.
However, 11 specified that relief directed to,vard modiflcauon of defendants'
conduct, rather than toward structural changes 111 the industry, would be permissible. It said that the district court \,as free to consider such relief on
remand. Hence, the appeals court affirmed the district court's opinion 111
part, reversed it in part, and remanded 11 in part (State of California, PlaintiffAppellee, v. American Stores Compan1 • 872 F. 2d).
The Ruling of the U. . uprcme Court
California soon petitioned for a hearing before the U.S. Supreme Court.
This was granted, as the Court said, to "resolve connict in the Circuits over
whether divestiture 1s a form of injunctive relief within the meaning of Section 16" (California v. American Stores Co., Slip Opinion). The case was
argued in January, 1990, and decided on April 30, 1990. The Court was unanimous in its decision to reverse the ruli ng of the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals.
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The connict to which the Court referred involved the meaning of t he term
"injunctive relief" as used in Section 16 of the Clayton Act. Specifically,
the question concerned whether divestiture was included under t his term. The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, whose decision was being appealed in this
case, reasoned in its IT&T opinion that this term , as contained wit hin Section 16, was ambiguous and that it was, therefore, necessary to review the
statute's legislative history to determine whether it included divestiture lli!.:
ternational Telephone and Telegraph Corp. v. Genera l Telephone and Electronics Corp., 1975). After having reviewed a colloquy during a hearing before
a subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the House, it concluded that
the bill's authors had not intended LO authorize "dissolution" or "divestiture" remedies in actions initiated by private parties. H owever, the First Circuit subsequently rejected that reasoning and found instead that a fair reading
of the statutory text required an interpretation of the term "injunctive relief"
broad enough to encompass divestiture. Further, the court doubted whether
the references to "dissolution" in the legislative history referred to "divestiture" and did not, in any event, view this evidence as sufficient to justify
a restrictive reading of the Act that seemed inconsistent with its basic policy
(California v. American Stores Co., Slip Opinion).
Prior to this, the Third Circuit had also expressed in dictum the opinion
that divestiture is a form of injunctive relief under Section 16 of the Clayton
Act (NBO Industries Treadway Co .• Inc. v. Brunswick Corp .• 1975). In addition, a number of district courts have reached the same conclusion. ' Other
courts, however, have followed the Ninth Circuit. '
Defendant American had adopted the analysis of the inth Circuit but
placed even greater reliance on two additional arguments. First, it argued
that there was a significant difference between the text of Section 15 and
that of Section 16 of the Clayton Act. The former section authorizes equitable relief in actions brought by the federal government and, the lauer, in
actions brought by other parties. Specifically, the defendant argued that while
Section 15 was broad enough to encourage tructural relief, Section 16 was
limited to relief against anticompetitive conduct. The defendant's second additional argument was that Section 16 of the Clayton Act reflected a wellaccepted distinction between prohibitory injunctions (which are authorized
under the section) and mandatory injunction which, the defendant argued,
are not (California v. American Stgre~, Slip Opinion). Prohibitory injunctions essentially are orders of courts in the form of judgments directing someone not to do certain things. Mandatory injunctions, on the other hand,
basically command defendants to do some positive acts or particular things.
In beginning its case analysi , the Supreme Court noted that Section 15
of the Clayton Act granted federal district courts jurisdiction "to prevent
and remain violations of this Act ... "(15 U.S.C. §25) and that Section 16
entitled private parties ... "to sue and have injunctive relief ... against
threatened loss or damage by an antitrust violation ... when and under the
same conditions a nd principles as inj unctive relief against the threatened conduct that wi ll cause loss or damage is granted by courts of equity" (15 U.S.C.
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§26). The Court asserted that the general language of Section 15 which further provides that antitrust violations "shall be enjoined or otherwise prohibited" is sufficiently broad to authorize divestiture and that, in fact, in
government actions, divestiture is the preferred remedy for an illegal merger
or acqu1s1t1on. ot only did the Court feel that, on its face, the simple grant
of authority in Section I6 to "have injunctive relief" seemed to encompass
divestiture just as plainly as comparable language in Section 15, it also felt
that it could be plausibly argued that the terms of ection I 6 were more expansive than those of Section 15. The Court agreed ,,ith the First Circuit
Court of Appeals that the plain text of Section 16 authorized divestiture
decree to remedy ection 7 violations (C_ahfornia,. American Store~. Slip
Opinion).
The Court contended that defendant American rested Its contrary argument upon the two aforementioned phrases of Section 16 ,,hich narrow its
scope. The Court felt that contrary to American's ,ie,v, the requirement of
"threatened loss or damage" was satisfied in this case because the allegations of the complaint, the d1smct court's findings, as well as the opinion
of the Court of Appeal , all as urned that even 1f the merger was a com pleted ,1olation of law , the threatened harm to Cahforn1a consumers pers1 ted.
The Court reasoned that 1f divestiture was an appropriate means of preventing that harm, the statutory reference to "threatened loss or damage" surely did not negate the Court's power to grant such relief. Further, the Court
declared that the second phrase wh1ch referred to "threatened conduct that
w111 cause loss or damage" was not drafted as a ltmuation on the power to
grant relief but rather was a pan of the general reference to the standards
that should be applied in fashioning inJuncti,e relief. It emphaticall; stated
that this phrase was surely not the equivalent of a directive stating that unJa,, fut conduct ma; be proh1b1ted but that structural relief may not be mandated (Cahforn1a v. American _stores, Shp Opm1on).
Further, the Court noted that the analysis of the issue by the inth Circult Court of Appeals demonstrated that the distinction ad,ocated by the
defendant between conduct and structure - or between prohibitory and mandatory relief - was illusory 111 a case of this kind. For, as the Court explained,
the inth Circuit in the IT&T case rccogn11ed that an inJunct1on prohibiting
the parent company from voti ng the stock of the subsidiary should not be
treated different); from a mandatory order of divestiture. In the present case,
the Court related that the dimict court had treated the " Hold eparate Agreement" as a form of "indirect divestiture." In both cases, then, the Court
deemed the inJu ncu,e relief to be unquestionably prohibitive of "conduct"
b; the defendants. llence, the Court found that the defendam 's arguments
which centered upon a distinction between mandatory and prohibitive relief
did not explain why such remedies would be inappropriate (<;::alifornia,.
American ~tores, Shp Opinion).
In continuing its analysis, the Court noted that if it assumed that the proposed merger violated the antitrust laws, and if it agreed with the district
court's finding that the conduct of the merged enterprise threatened economic
10

harm 10 California consumers, then the literal text of Section 16 was plainly
sufficient to authorize injunctive relief, inclusive of an order of divestiture
that would prohibit such conduct from causing that harm. This ruling was'.
as the Court declared, consistent with its precedents, which had upheld injunctions issued pursuant to Section 16 regardless of whether they were of
the mandatory or prohibitive variety.' Further, the court noted that it had
recognized in construing Section 16 that it was enacted " not merely 10 provide private relief, but ... 10 serve as well the high purpose of enforcing
the antitrust )a\,s" (Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research. Inc., 395 U.
S. l00, 129- 133 (1969)). In addition, the Court held that the const ruing of
Section 16 to encompass divestiture decrees made it more able than was defendant American to harmonize said sec11011 with Its statutory context. For, as
the Court asserted, the Clayton Act's other provisions manifested a clear
intent to encourage ,igorous pm ate li11gation against an1icompe1iti\e mergers. 11 concluded that private enforcement of the Act was not an afterthought
but was rather an integral part of the congressional plan for protecting competi11on (California , . American Stores, Slip Opinion).
The Court contended that Congress had made express ll ,ie\, that d1ves1i1ure was the most suitable remed> in a suit for relief from a ection 7 v10la1ion by directing the r ederal Trade Commission, in ection 11 of the Act,
10 issue orders not o nly requiring that a ,1olator of Section 7 "cease and
desist from the \IOlation" but also that the ,1olator "divest itself of the stock
held" in ,iolation of the Act. On the abo,e basi,, the Court concluded that
SeCllon 16, construed 10 authorize a private dive,ti1 ure remedy \\hen appropriate according to principles of equity, fit well in a s1a1u1ory scheme that fa\ ored pri,atc enforcement. subJected merger, to earching scrutm), and
regarded d1ve\11ture as the best remedy 10 redress the ills of an a1111compe1i1ive merger. In all, then, the Court did not accept the defenda111's \IC\\, as
adopted by the 1111h C1rcu1t. that the statutory language of the Clayton Act
\\ as ambiguous (('ahfornia \. American ~tore,, Slip Opinion).
eH'.rthele,,, the C.ourt embarJ..ed on a fairly lengthy considerauon of the
lcg1sla11,e h1s1or> that had led the Nmth Circuit 10 place such a narro\, con,1ruc11on on Section 16 of the Clayton '\ct. Therem, 11 comic.Jcred the dis1111c11on bernccn d1,solu11on and dl\eslllure. 11 declared that d1,solu11011 wa
100 vague and 1ll-def111ed, a remedy 10 be either mcorporated 11110 or e,cluded from 5ec11on 16 a, such. Congress, the Court noted, had clearly a\ oided
the \\ ord by ,peaJ..mg in term, of equitable relief dra\, n to red re damage
or loss possibly suffered by a private party a, a result of the Act\\ 1ola11on.
The Court found 1ha1 although, at the 11me of the Clayton '\ct' framing,
d1veslllure was encompas ed \\ 1thin the concept of d1,,olution, 1h1 did 1101
imply that the equi table for mulation of Section 16 could not permit divestiture 10 the e.,clusion of more SC\ ere sanctions that a lso were included under
the designation "dissolution." T he Court felt that a fair readmg of the entire legislative history wpported the conclusion that ection 16 means exactly what it say and that 11 hould be construed generou ly and flexibly pursuant
to pri nciples of equity (Califo1 ma v. American ~tores, li p Opinion). Hence,
11

the Court concluded that a district court had the power to order divestiture
in appropriate cases brought under Section 16 as long as a private litigant
had standing; that is, as long as he had proved "threatened loss or damage"
10 his/her own interests.
ummar}' and Conclusions
This paper has reviewed the chain of legal events involved in the proposed
merger of two supermarket chains in the State of California. Included in
the above were the original complaint of the plaintiff, California, the rulings of the U.S. district court, as well as of the inth Circuit Court of Appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court. The main thrust of the case dealt with
whether private parties could obtain orders of divestiture under Section 16
of the Clayton Act. The district court had ordered such a divestiture, but
the inth Circuit ruled that this was not perm1 s1ble under Section 16. The
Supreme Court, however, overturned this and declared that district courts
did, indeed, have the po\,er to order di"es111ure under said section. This ruling has, thereby, resolved connicting opinions on this matter on the pan of
the First and inth Circuits. In essentially adopting the vie,, of the First Circuit, the Court has officially armed private parties of all manner with a significant I}' po,,erful weapon m antitrust enforcement rela11ve to mergers.

Notes
Consolidated Gold Fields. PLC. v. Anglo American Corp., Trade Cases
68, 536 (S.O. . Y. 1989) (ruling that a hold separate order and dive titure
were available remedies); Tast} Bakmg CQ._,. Ralston Purina In ., 653 F.
Supp. 1250, 1255-56 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (ruling that dives11ture ,vas an available remedy); Joseph Ciccone & Sons. \,. Eastern Ind., 537 F. Supp. 623, 630
(E.D. Pa. 1982) (again ruling that divestiture was an available remedy);~
Concrete Corp. v. DIC Concrete Corp., 467 F. Supp. 1016 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(divestiture available); and Julius M. Ames Co. v. Bos111ch. Inc., 240 F. Supp.
521, 526 (S.O. . Y. 1965) (divestiture available).
'Arthur S. Langenderfer. Inc. v. S.E. J ohnson Co., 729 F. 2d 1050, 1060
(6th Cir.); cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036, 105 S. Ct. 510, 83 L. Ed. 2d 401 (1984)
(holdmg that divestiture 1s not an available remedy under SeCllon 16 of the
Clayton Act); Pretz v. HQ~tein Fnesian Ass'n. of American, 698 F. Supp.
1531, 1536-37 (0. Kan. 1988) ( divestiture not available); and Mr. Frank.,
Inc. v. Waste Management. Inc .. , 591 F. Supp. 859, 865 ( .0. Ill. 1984)
(also ruling that divestiture was not an available remedy).
'Zenith Radio Corp, v Hazehine Research. Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 129- 133
( 1969) (which reinstated an injunction requiring defendants to withdraw from
patent pools); and Silver v. ew York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341,345
365, (1963) (which reinstated judgment for defendants in a suit to compel
the installation of wire services).
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